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The efficient rate of return of a zero-coupon bond with maturity t is determined by our 
expectations about the mean (+), variance (-) and skewness (+) of the growth of aggregate 
consumption between 0 and t. The shape of the yield curve is thus determined by how these 
moments vary with t. We first examine growth processes in which a higher past economic 
growth yields a first-degree dominant shift in the distribution of the future economic growth, 
as assumed for example by Vasicek (1977). We show that when the growth process exhibits 
such a positive serial correlation, then the yield curve is decreasing if the representative agent 
is prudent (u
'  > 0), because of the increased risk that it yields for the distant future. A similar 
definition is proposed for the concept of second-degree stochastic correlation, as observed for 
example in the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model, with the opposite comparative static property 
holding under temperance (u
'  < 0), because the change in downside risk (or skweness) that it 
generates. Finally, using these theoretical results, we propose two arguments in favor of using 
a smaller rate to discount cash-flows with very large maturities, such as those associated to 
global warming or nuclear waste management. 
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An earlier version of this paper was entitled ”Transitory shocks to GNP and the consumption-
based term structure of interest rates”. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
How much eﬀort are we ready to make today to improve the future? House-
holds are faced with this question when they plan their savings for retirement,
whereas entrepreneurs have to determine whether to undertake new invest-
ment projects. At the collective level, one needs to determine, for example,
whether to limit the national budget deﬁcit, or whether to invest in the ed-
ucation system. In a recent past, similar questions emerged, but with the
striking innovation of being related to the far-distant future. Exploring the
universe, protecting the biodiversity, limiting the extraction of exhaustible
resources, dealing with nuclear wastes and global warming are a few exam-
ples of policy questions that confront us to our attitude towards improving
the welfare of human beings that will live in hundreds or thousands years in
the future. These valuation questions are all solved by the selection of the
discount rate.
As is well-known, the use of a single rate to discount sure cash-ﬂows at
all maturities implies that costs and beneﬁts occurring, say, in more than
100 years are typically irrelevant for the decision, because of the exponential
nature of discounting. This is why for example the so-called ”Copenhagen
Consensus”1 ranked all projects linked to the prevention of global warming
at the lowest priority level based on standard cost-beneﬁt analyses with a
constant discount rate. The problem is that there is a priori no scientiﬁcr e a -
son to believe that one should discount all maturities at the same rate. The
tradition of using a constant rate in cost-beneﬁt analysis should not be seen
as a dogma, but rather as a useful practical simpliﬁcation. Various authors
— among whom Weitzman (1998, 2001, 2004) is the most vocal — claimed
that one should opt for discount rates that are decreasing with the maturity
of the cash ﬂows under scrutiny. Weitzman (2004) in particular develops an
argument for selecting a zero discount rate for maturities around 50 years,
the discount rate becoming even negative for longer time horizons. Of course,
adopting such recommendations would massively reallocate our collective in-
vestments towards those beneﬁting to distant generations, potentially at the
detriment of actions with more immediate beneﬁts such as ﬁghting malaria
and promoting education in developing countries. It is therefore important
1It is the outcome of a conference held in Copenhagen in May 2004 aimed at ranking
a set of various collective investment projects, including ﬁghting AIDS and malaria in
developing countries, water management, biodiversity, education,....
1to have a good understanding of the reasons why we should adopt such de-
creasing discount rates.
Since the seminal contribution of Vasicek (1977), economists have inten-
sively explored how eﬃcient discount rates should vary with the maturity of
the corresponding cash payment. The immense literature on the term struc-
ture of interest rates has produced an important corpus of knowledge about
this question. This is quite unfortunate that researchers discussing this ques-
tion in the various forums of environmental economics do not take advantage
of the existence of this vast literature.2 There are several reasons for that.
First, most papers on the yield curve are aimed at explaining the observed
shape of that curve, whereas environmental economists have a much more
normative approach. Notice however that the absence of frictions in the stan-
dard models on the term structure implies that the equilibrium interest rates
are also the socially eﬃcient discount rates to be used in cost-beneﬁt analysis.
Second, researchers in ﬁnance are usually interested in pricing traded assets,
which implies that their time-horizon is limited by the largest maturity of
existing liquid markets for risk-free assets, which does not exceed 30 years.
Last but not least, this literature is highly complex, and it does usually
not provide intuition to the underlying phenomena. This is well summarized
by Piazzesi (2004): ”The quest for understanding what moves bond yields
has produced an enormous literature with its own journals and graduate
courses. Those who want to join the quest are faced with considerable obsta-
cles. The literature has evolved mostly in continuous time, where stochastic
calculus reigns and partial diﬀerential equations spit ﬁre. The knights in
this literature are ﬁghting for diﬀerent goals, which makes it often diﬃcult
to comprehend why the quest is moving in certain directions.” This quest
leads to the (preliminary) conclusion that the shape of the yield curve is gov-
erned by the dynamics of the short term interest rate (and maybe a few other
stochastic factors) that may entails mean reversion together with temporary
and permanent shocks. Because the term structure is obtained by arbitrage
using an exogenously given dynamic process for the price kernel, this rea-
soning is usually not based on individual preferences. It is therefore not an
easy starting block to explain to public decision-makers how much eﬀort our
2See for example the collective book edited by Portney and Weyant (1999) on discount-
ing. See also Arrow et al. (1996), Weitzman (1998, 2001), Newell and Pizer (2003) and
Groom, Koundouri, Panopoulou and Pantelidis (2004).
2generation should undertake to improve the welfare of future generations.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we exhibit the fundamental
determinants of the shape of the yield curve based on the preferences of the
representative agent and on the stochastic process of aggregate consumption
in the economy. Second, we examine realistic dynamic growth processes that
are relevant to determine the very long discount rates.
The eﬃcient interest rate associated to time horizon t is decreasing in
our willingness to save in order to ﬁnance consumption at that date, which
itself depends upon our expectations about the growth of our incomes over
[0,t]. Therefore, the term structure of interest rates provides a rich set of
information about these expectations. For example, when consumers expect
an increase in their future incomes, they want to cash this beneﬁti m m e -
diately by reducing their saving. This raises the equilibrium interest rate.
This wealth eﬀect relies on the standard assumption that consumers want
to smooth their consumption over time. It explains why the yield curve is
upward sloping when the representative agent expects an accelerating growth
rate in the future (Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991)).
Among the many diﬃculties to extract testable hypothesis about the
relationship between the term structure and expectations about the future
economic activity, the most important one is due to uncertainty. Since Leland
(1968), we know that uncertainty about future incomes raises the prudent
consumers’ willingness to save. This precautionary eﬀect tends to reduce the
interest rate. This implies for example that the anticipation of a deterministic
reduction in the volatility of growth yields an increasing yield curve (Barsky
(1989)). It is interesting to examine how does the accumulation of risk for
longer time horizons inﬂuence the determination of the corresponding interest
rate. Because longer horizons mean larger expected consumption, people
want to save less for these better times. On the contrary, longer horizons also
mean more risk, which implies that consumers want to save more for these
more uncertain times. Which of these wealth and precautionary eﬀects will
dominate the other? If the wealth eﬀect dominates the precautionary eﬀect,
then the yield curve must be increasing.
The simplest case is when the growth of the economy follows a stationary
random process. In this case, both the expected log consumption and its
variance increases proportionally with t h et i m eh o r i z o n .I ti m p l i e st h a tt h e
wealth eﬀect and the precautionary eﬀect exactly compensate each other
when the representative agent has a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
3As is well-known, CRRA combined with stationarity implies that the yield
curve is completely ﬂat. In sections 3 and 4 of this paper, we show how the
existence of serial correlations in the growth rate of the economy aﬀects the
s h a p eo ft h ey i e l dc u r v e .W ed e ﬁne two types of serial correlations. Positive
ﬁrst-degree stochastic correlation (FSC) occurs when an increase in the ﬁrst
subperiod growth rate induces a ﬁrst-degree stochastic improvement in the
conditional distribution of the growth rate in the second subperiod. Such a
positive serial correlation in the growth of the economy tends to magnify the
long-term risk on consumption relative to the short-term risk. It implies that
the prudent representative agent will want to rebalance her eﬀorts towards
the longer time horizons, thereby tending to reduce long interest rates. This
is formally shown in section 3 in a much simpler and more intuitive way than
traditionally done in the existing literature. It is also more general in the
sense that our result only requires that the representative agent be prudent.
FSC correlations are the main feature of the two classical models of the term
structure, namely Vasicek (1977) and Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985a,b).
There is positive second-degree stochastic correlation (SSC) in growth
rates if an increase in the ﬁrst subperiod rate yields an increase in risk in
the conditional distribution of growth in the second subperiod. This tends
to raise the skewness of the distribution of future consumption. Ex ante, it
reduces the expected marginal utility of wealth at that maturity if the fourth
derivative of the utility function is negative, a condition that is satisﬁed for
CRRA preferences. This tends to reduce the willingness to purchase more
zero-coupon bonds associated to long maturities, thereby raising their rate of
return. This is proved in section 4. Notice that the main feature of the Cox-
Ingersoll-Ross model is to add some SSC correlations in the Vasicek model.
The link of our results to these two classical models are made more explicit
in section 5.
In section 6, we examine two speciﬁc stochastic processes with positive
FSC correlations that are realistic representations of the uncertainty faced
by Humanity in the very long run. The ﬁrst stochastic process for aggregate
consumption has a drift that can take two possible values. A switch from
one drift to the other can occur at each period with a very small probability.
This is aimed at modeling the kind of event that we experienced with the
industrial revolution at the end of the 18th century, where the drift changed
quite abruptly from the secular 0% per year to 2% per year since then.
Our model formalizes the risk of a switch in the opposite direction — ”The
4Limit to Growth” — due for example to the scarcity of natural resources or
to the extinction of scientiﬁc progresses. We show that the positive FSC
correlation that this stochastic process yields a strong negative eﬀect on the
rate at which we should discount far-distant cash-ﬂows. In the second model
of long-term uncertainty inspired from Weitzman (2004), we assume that
the drift is unique but unknown. As time goes by, one will use Bayes rule to
update the beliefs about the true value of the drift. This stochastic process
also yields positive FSC correlations — and thus decreasing discount rates —
for the simple reason that a good news in the short term is a good news for
the secular distribution of growth.
2 The term structure without predictability
T h ep r e f e r e n c e so ft h er e p r e s e n t a t i v ea g e n ti nt h ee c o n o m ya r er e p r e s e n t e d
by her utility function u and by her rate of pure preference for the present δ.
The utility function u on consumption is assumed to be three times diﬀer-
entiable, increasing and concave. Let e ct denote consumption at date t.T h e
equilibrium per period rate of return at date 0 for a zero-coupon bond matur-
ing at date t is denoted rt. To be in equilibrium, investing marginally in such
an asset should leave the expected discounted utility of the representative






which is the standard Euler equation for the consumption-saving problem.
The classical consumption-based pricing formula is obtained by rewriting
condition (1) as







Two factors determine by how much the risk-free rate exceeds the rate of
pure preference for the present δ.T h e ﬁrst factor is a wealth eﬀect. If we
expect to consume more in the future, i.e., if Ee ct >c 0, the marginal utility of
one more euro in the future is smaller than the marginal utility of one more
euro immediately: u0(Ee ct) <u 0(c0). It implies that −t−1 ln(u0(Ee ct)/u0(c0))
is positive. This positive wealth eﬀect is increasing in the expected growth
rate of consumption over the entire period [0,t]a n di nt h er a t ea tw h i c h
5marginal utility is decreasing with consumption, which is measured by the
index of relative risk aversion R(c)=−cu00(c)/u0(c). The intuition is that
higher expectations about future incomes reduces the willingness to save,
thereby raising the equilibrium interest rate.
But, except when marginal utility is linear, Eu0(e ct)i sn o te q u a lt ou0(Ee ct),
which introduces a second factor to the determination of interest rates. When
the representative agent is prudent, i.e., when marginal utility is convex, the
uncertainty surrounding future consumption raises the expected marginal
utility: Eu0(e ct) >u 0(Ee ct). This raises the willingness to save, thereby yield-
ing a reduction of the equilibrium interest rate. This precautionary eﬀect
goes opposite to the wealth eﬀect. It is increasing in the riskiness of future
consumption and in the index of convexity of marginal utility, which is de-
ﬁned as relative prudence P(c)=−cu000(c)/u00(c). We can make these
diﬀerent factors more explicit by using second-order Taylor approximations
of u0(zt) in the above equality. This technique yields
rt ' δ + R(c0)









where the three terms in the right-hand side measure respectively the impa-
tience eﬀect, the wealth eﬀect and the precautionary eﬀect. This approxi-
mation is exact for the instantaneous rate rdt.
The term structure of interest rate is determined by how these two con-
ﬂicting factors are compounded over time. A more distant future usu-
ally yields a larger expected consumption and a larger uncertainty. The
risk-averse and prudent representative agent’s willingness to purchase zero-
coupon bonds with that long maturity is reduced by the larger expected con-
sumption, and is increased by the larger uncertainty. Therefore, as suggested
by approximation (3), an increasing (decreasing) yield curve is obtained if the
wealth eﬀect becomes more (less) dominant compared to the precautionary
eﬀect when considering longer time horizons.
To illustrate, let us consider a simple case. Suppose that u(c)=c1−γ/(1−
γ), which implies that R(c)=γ and P(c)=γ +1f o ra l lc. Suppose also
that the logarithm of consumption follows a stationary Brownian motion:3
dlnct = µdt + σdzt, (4)
3Using Ito’s Lemma, this is equivalent to assume that dc/c =( µ +0 .5σ2)dt + σdz.
6where µ and σ are two scalars measuring respectively the mean and standard
deviation of the change in log consumption. It implies that the logarithm
of consumption at date t is normally distributed with mean µt +l nc0 and
variance σ2t. This implies in turn that
Eu0(e ct)
u0(c0)








Thus, using equation (2) yields4
rt = δ + γµ − 0.5γ
2σ
2. (5)
This shows that when relative risk aversion is constant(CRRA) and the
growth rate of the economy follows a stationary Brownian motion, a longer
t i m eh o r i z o ny i e l d sa ni n c r e a s ei nt h ew e a l t he ﬀect and an increase in the
precautionary eﬀect that exactly compensate each other, yielding a ﬂat yield
curve.
Gollier (2002 a,b) characterized the conditions on preferences that im-
ply a monotone yield curve under the assumption of a stationary Brownian
motion. For example, he shows that increasing relative risk aversion im-
plies an increasing yield curve if the probability of recession is small enough
(µ/σ >> 0). In this paper, we follow a more standard strategy which consists
in relaxing the assumption of a stationary Brownian motion. This is relaxed
by assuming that the mean µ and/or the volatility σ of the consumption
growth process are path-dependent, i.e., that the growth at time t depends
upon the growth in the periods preceding t. In a word, we assume that future
growth rates are predictable. The typical methodology in the literature on
the term structure of interest rates is to assume the following time series
model:
dlnct = µ(s)dt + σc(s)dzt,
ds = g(s)dt + σs(s)dzt.
4We can reconcile equations (3) and (5) by observing that the growth rate of expected
consumption equals µ +0 .5σ2. This implies that equation (5) can be rewritten as




This proves that approximation (3) is exact in this case.
7Both the mean and the volatility of the growth rate of the economy are
aﬀected by a state variable (also called a ”factor”) s that itself follows a
potentially non-stationary Brownian motion. The special case of a deter-
ministic process for the state variable (σs = 0) is easy to treat using the
above integration method. For example, when σc(s) ≡ σ, we easily obtain in
t h eC R R Ac a s et h a t
rt = δ + γm(t) − 0.5γ
2σ
2, (6)
where m(t)=t−1 R t
0 µ(s(τ))dτ is the mean change in log consumption in
period [0,t], and s(τ) is the solution of the diﬀerential equation s0 = g(s)
with initial condition s(0) = s0.O n l y t h e w e a l t h e ﬀect is aﬀected by the
deterministic change in the expectation µ about the growth rate of the econ-
omy. These changes in expectation explain why the yield curve is usually
not ﬂat for short and medium time-horizons. For example, the expectation
of an accelerating growth implies an increasing yield curve. Observe from (6)
that the unpredictable shocks in changes in log consumption have no eﬀect
on the shape of the yield curve. It only shifts it downwards.
The complexity of the theory on the yield curve comes from the stochastic
component of the motion of the state variable s (σs 6= 0). In this paper, we
isolate two eﬀects of these predictable changes in expectations. Suppose ﬁrst
that the volatility σc of the growth rate of the economy is constant. When
σc and σs h a v et h es a m es i g n ,a n dw h e nµ is increasing in s, the expected
future growth rate of consumption is positively correlated with the short-
term growth rate. More precisely, an increase in the stochastic component
dzt of the short-term growth yields a ﬁrst-degree stochastic dominant shift
i nt h ef u t u r eg r o w t hr a t e .I ns e c t i o n3 ,w ee x a m i n et h ee ﬀect of this positive
correlation on the shape of the yield curve. Alternatively, suppose that the
expected growth rate µ of the economy is state-independent, and that the
volatility of the growth rate is increasing in the state variable. Then, if
σc and σs have the same sign, the volatility of the future growth rate of
the economy is positively correlated with the short-term growth rate. More
precisely, an increase in the growth rate dzt in the short run yields a second-
degree stochastic shift in the future growth rate. We examine the eﬀect of
this type of statistical relations on the shape of the yield curve in section 4.
83 First-degree stochastic correlations
In this section, we consider an arbitrary stochastic process for e ct.W ee x a m i n e
the eﬀect of positive serial correlations in changes in consumption on the
interest rate associated to maturity T. To do so, let us split period [0,T]i n t o
two subperiods [0,t]a n d[ t,T] for some arbitrary date t<T.L e te x1 denote
the change in consumption during the ﬁrst subperiod [0,t], and e x2 | x1 the
change in the consumption over period [t,T] conditional to x1. It implies that
consumption at date T equals c0+e x1+e x2 | e x1.L e tG(.) denote the cumulative
distribution function of e x1: G(x)=P r [ e x1 <x ]. Let also F(. | x1)b et h e
cumulative distribution of e x2 conditional to x1: F(x | x1)=P r [ e x2 <x| x1].
Following Lehman (1966), we propose the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 Consider a pair of random variables (e x1,e x2) with marginal cdf
G for e x1 and cdf F for e x2 conditional to x1. We say that there is a positive
FSC correlation between e x1 and e x2 if F is nonincreasing in x1 for all x2.
In other words, an increase in x1 generates a ﬁrst-order stochastic dom-
inant shift in the conditional distribution of e x2. Milgrom (1981) uses this
concept to deﬁne the notion of a good news. An example of stochastic pro-
cess that satisﬁes the FSC property is the AR(1) process e x2 | x1 = φx1 + e ε
with a positive φ.
The long-term interest rate in such an economy equals




Eu0(c0 + e x1 +(e x2 | e x1))
u0(c0)
. (7)
We want to compare this rate to the one that would prevail in an economy
with the same marginal distributions for e x1 and e x2, but with no serial correla-
tion between them. Let e x2 denote the unconditional change in consumption
in the second subperiod. In the economy without any serial correlation, the
long-term interest rate would equal




Eu0(c0 + e x1 + e x2)
u0(c0)
. (8)
Interest rate b rT would be what one would obtain from the calibrated model by
assuming independence and by using the observed variance of annual changes
in consumption as the estimation of Va r(∆c). We want to determine the
9conditions under which rT is smaller than b rT, when e x2 | e x1 exhibits positive
FSC correlation with respect to e x1. There is a simple intuition for why this
should be the case. The existence of a positive correlation in the changes
in consumption tends to magnify the long-term risk compared to short-term
risks. This induces the prudent representative agent to purchase more zero-
coupon bonds with a long maturity, thereby reducing the equilibrium long-
term rate. Comparing (7) and (8) implies that rT is smaller than b rT if
Eu
0(c0 + e x1 + e x2 | e x1) ≥ Eu
0(c0 + e x1 + e x2). (9)
The following Lemma is useful to examine this problem.
Lemma 1 Consider a diﬀerentiable function h deﬁned in a domain D of
R2, together with any pair of random variables (e x1,e x2 | e x1) with support in
D that satisﬁes positive ﬁrst-order correlation and whose support is in the
domain of h.T h e n ,
Eh(e x1,e x2 | e x1) ≥ Eh(e x1,e x2)( 1 0 )
if and only if h is supermodular, i.e., if ∂h/∂x2 is increasing in x1.
Proof: See the appendix.5
Applying this lemma to condition (9) requires using function h(x1,x 2)=
u0(c0 + x1 + x2). It is supermodular if the representative agent is prudent.
Proposition 1 T h ep r e s e n c eo fa n yp o s i t i v eﬁrst-order stochastic correla-
tion in changes in consumption reduces the long-term risk-free rate if and
only if the representative agent is prudent.
This result conﬁrms our intuition: positive FSC correlation in changes in
consumption raises the riskiness of consumption at date T,without changing
its expected value. Under prudence, this reduces the interest rate associated
to maturity T. It tends to generate a downward-sloping yield curve.
I tw o u l dh a v eb e e nm o r ef a s h i o n e dt od e ﬁne e x1 and e x2 | x1 as the (con-
ditional) changes in log consumption over respectively subperiods [0,t]a n d
[t,T] .T h i sc h a n g et h en a t u r eo ft h ec o m p a r a t i v es t a t i ce x e r c i s eb e c a u s et h e
5We can also prove that if h is supermodular, then condition (10) is satisﬁed if and
only if (e x1, e x2) exhibits positive FSC.
10unconditional expectation of the log consumption is not the same as the log
of the unconditional expectation of consumption. Because e cT = c0ee x1+e x2|e x1
when xi denotes the change in log consumption, we can use Lemma 1 to
obtain the following alternative result. Observe that h(x1,x 2)=u0(c0ex1+x2)
is supermodular if relative prudence P(c)=−cu000(c)/u00(c)i sl a r g e rt h a n
unity.
Proposition 2 T h ep r e s e n c eo fa n yp o s i t i v eﬁrst-order stochastic correla-
tion in changes in log consumption reduces the long-term risk-free rate if and
only if relative prudence is larger than unity.
Similarly, the long-term risk-free rate is increased by any negative FSC
correlation if and only if relative prudence is larger than unity. Observe that
when relative risk aversion is constant (u(c)=c1−γ/(1−γ)), relative prudence
is also constant and is equal to relative risk aversion plus one. Thus, CRRA
implies that relative prudence is always larger than unity. When relative risk
aversion is constant, positive (negative) FSC correlation in changes in log
consumption always reduces (raises) the long-term risk-free rate.
It is easy to exhibit utility functions that are concave but whose relative
prudence is not larger than unity. For example, the simplest departure of
CRRA with u(c)=( c + k)1−g/(1 − g), k>0, implies a relative prudence
P(c)=( 1+g)c/(c+k). For such a concave utility function, relative prudence
tends to zero with c. At early stages of its development, this economy may
have an upward sloping yield curve even if growth rates are positively FSC
correlated. This comes from an implicit wealth increase. Observe that in
spite of the fact that the decorrelation does not aﬀect the unconditional
expected cumulative change in log consumption , the unconditional expected
cumulative change in the level of consumption is increased by the presence of
positive FSC correlation. This can be checked by using function h(x1,x 2)=
ex1+x2 in the Lemma. This implicit increase in expected future incomes
reduces the willingness to save for the long term, and it requires an increase
in the corresponding interest rate. Therefore, one needs a suﬃciently strong
precautionary eﬀect to dominate this opposite wealth eﬀect. By Proposition
2, it requires that relative prudence be larger than unity.
114 Second-degree stochastic correlations
A natural extension of this work is to examine economies where the changes
in consumption e x1 and e x2 are statistically related according to the positive
second-degree stochastic correlation (SSC) property. This is the case when
an increase in the ﬁrst period change in consumption raises the risk associ-
ated to the second period change in consumption in the sense of Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1970). In other words, the volatility of economic growth is in-
creased after a boom, and it is reduced after a downturn. An example of
such heteroskedastic process is e x2 = µ+x1e ε, with Ee ε =0a n de ε independent
of e x1.
Deﬁnition 2 Consider a pair of random variables (e x1,e x2 | e x1) with marginal
cdf G for e x1 and cdf F for e x2 conditional to x1. We say that there is a positive
SSC correlation between e x1 and e x2 if q(x2 | x1)=
R x2 F(y | x1)dy is non-
decreasing in x1 for all x2,a n di fE [e x2 | x1] is independent of x1.
We want to determine the eﬀect of such statistical relationship in changes
in consumption over time on the long-term interest rate. As in the previous
section, we compare an economy (e x1,e x2 | e x1) with positive SSC with another
one (e x1,e x2) in which changes in consumption are serially independent. The
following Lemma is helpful to solve this problem.
Lemma 2 Consider a twice diﬀerentiable function h deﬁned in a domain D
of R2, together with any pair of random variables (e x1,e x2 | e x1) with support
in D that satisﬁes positive second-degree correlation and whose support is in
the domain of h. Then,
Eh(e x1,e x2 | e x1) ≤ Eh(e x1,e x2)
if and only if −∂h/∂x2 is supermodular, i.e., if ∂2h/∂x2
2 is non-increasing in
x1.
Proof: See the appendix.
Notice that if we apply this lemma to function h(x1,x 2)=v(x1 + x2)
for any function v with a convex ﬁrst derivative, we obtain the result that,
under positive SSC, e x1 + e x2 | e x1 is a downside reduction in risk with respect
to e x1 + e x2,a sd e ﬁned by Geiss, Menezes and Tressler (1980). It implies that
12t h e s et w os u m sh a v et h es a m em e a na n dt h es a m ev a r i a n c e ,b u tt h eﬁrst has
a larger skewness than the second. This is not a surprise since a downside
reduction in risk is obtained by transferring zero-mean lotteries from low
wealth states to larger wealth levels, as explained by Eeckhoudt, Gollier and
Schneider (1995).
Applying this to the term structures given by (7) and (8) with h(x1,x 2)=
u0(c0 + x1 + x2), we obtain the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 The presence of any positive second-degree stochastic corre-
lation in changes in consumption raises the long-term risk-free rate if and
only if the third derivative of the utility function is non-increasing.
Observe that condition u0000 ≤ 0—w h i c hi ss o m e t i m e sr e f e r r e dt oa s” t e m -
perance” — is quite natural. It is necessary for the intuitive property that
absolute prudence −u000/u00 is decreasing in wealth, as explained by Kimball
(1990). Moreover, all CRRA functions satisfy this condition. There is a
simple intuition for why a positive SSC in ∆c should raise the equilibrium
long-term rate. Indeed, a positive SSCi m p l i e sa ni n c r e a s ei ns k e w n e s so f
e cT = c0+e x1+e x2.W h e nu0000 is negative, the increased skewness in e cT reduces
Eu0(e cT), which yields a reduction in the demand for the zero-coupon bond
which matures at T. This raises its equilibrium rate of return.
As in the previous section, we could have deﬁned e x1 and e x2 | x1 as the
changes in log consumption. We should then use Lemma 2 with h(x1,x 2)=
u0(c0ex1+x2). This yields the following result.
Proposition 4 Suppose that u is four times diﬀerentiable. The presence of
any positive second-order stochastic correlation in changes in log consumption
raises the long-term risk-free rate if and only if f(c)=u00(c)+3 cu000(c)+
c2u0000(c) is uniformly negative.
When relative risk aversion is constant, f(c)e q u a l s−γ3c−γ−1 which is
uniformly negative. This implies that a positive SSC correlation in ∆lnc
always raises the long-term interest rate for that family of utility functions.
This tends to generate an upward-sloping yield curve. Notice that condition
f ≥ 0i nP r o p o s i t i o n4a d d st h et w ot e r m su00 and 3cu000 to condition u0000 <
0 in Proposition 3. The ﬁrst additional term is due to the fact that the
decorrelation of changes in log consumption raises the expected consumption
13at T. This reinforces the initial reason for a longer long-term rate. Also, the
decorrelation yields an increase in the second moment of e cT. Under prudence,
this tends to reduce the long-term rate. This explains the opposite term
3cu000 > 0 in the deﬁnition of function f.A s s a i d a b o v e , t h e t w o n e g a t i v e
terms must always dominate this positive term in the case of CRRA.
5 Relations with the existing literature on
the term structure
Our aim in this section is not to provideas u r v e yo ft h ee n o r m o u se x i s t i n g
literature on the term structure of interest rates. Rather, we want here to
illustrate our results by comparing them to those of the two most famous
time series models used in this literature: Vasicek (1977) and Cox, Ingersoll
and Ross (1985a,b). In most existing models of the term structure, the state
variable is the instantaneous interest rate r0. For example, in the model
of Vasicek (1977), the time series model for the stochastic discount factor
Λ(t)=e−δtu0(ct)/u0(c0) takes the following form:
dΛ
Λ
= −r0dt − σΛdz
dr0 = φ(r − r0)dt + σrdz.
The term structure is then obtained by rewriting the equilibrium condition
(1) as rt = −t−1 lnEΛt.P a r a m e t e r σr is the conditional volatility of the
instantaneous interest rate. Parameter φ controls mean reversion: if φ =0 ,
the instantaneous risk-free rate r0 exhibits no tendency to return to any
speciﬁc value. When φ > 0, the instantaneous rate r0 is expected to return
to its mean r at rate φ. With a typical value of φ =0 .3y e a r −1, 6 this yields
a half-life time of 2.3 years for a shock on the instantaneous interest rate.
6For example, Backus, Foresi and Telmer (1998) consider φ =0 .024 month−1.
14Assuming CRRA, this model can be rewritten as7
dlnc =







dr0 = φ(r − r0)dt + σrdz.
We recognize here various elements aﬀecting the yield curve. First, we
observe that the conditional volatility of the growth rate of consumption is
a constant σΛ/γ. This excludes the existence of SSC correlation. Second,
when φ 6=0 , there is a deterministic component in the expectations about the
future growth of the economy. When the current level of r0 is below r, one
anticipates an accelerating economic growth, which makes the yield curve
increasing for short and medium maturities. In fact, when there is no serial
correlation (σr = 0), using equation (6) yields




T h em e a ny i e l dc u r v e ,w h i c hi so b t a i n e db yt a k i n gr0 = r, is completely
ﬂat in that case. Thus, a non-zero slope to the mean yield curve can be
obtained only by introducing some permanency to shocks on lnc. Indeed,
when σr 6= 0 and has the same sign as σΛ, there is positive FSC correlation
in the time series of ∆lnc. As claimed by Proposition 2, this tends to
reduce the long-term interest rates, thereby yielding a reduction in the slope
of the yield curve. This is conﬁrmed by the analytical solution obtained
by Vasicek (1977) which adds a third term υt in the right-hand side of
(12), with υt being negative and decreasing in t when σrσΛ is positive.8 In
order to explain the upward-sloping mean yield curve, as documented for
7By Ito’s Lemma, the reader can check that


























15example by Backus, Foresi and Telmer (1998), one needs to have negative
FSC correlations in ∆lnc. Assuming without loss of generality that σr is
positive, this requires that σΛ/γ be suﬃciently negative. This sheds light on
why ”a little experimentation tells us that σΛ governs the average slope of
the yield curve, with negative values required to produce an upward slope
we observe in the data” (Backus, Foresi and Telmer (1998)).
The Cox-Ingersol-Ross (CIR) model adds a square root terms in the
volatility, which makes it time-varying:
dlnc =









dr = φ(r − r)dt + σr
√
rdz.
This implies that a positive shock on the state variable r increases both the
short term expected growth of the log consumption and its future volatility.
This yields a positive SSC correlation of ∆lnc. This captures the fact that
higher interest rates seem to be more volatile. As claimed in Proposition 4,
this positive SSC in ∆lnc generates an unambiguous increase in the long-
term rate compared to what is obtained in Vasicek’s model. However, as
explained for example by Backus, Foresi and Telmer (1998), the sophistica-
tion introduced in the CIR model does not change the shape of the yield
curve markedly.
We hereafter focus on quantifying the eﬀect of FSC correlations. What
do we know about the time series of changes in log consumption? Following
Cochrane (1988) and Cogley (1990), let us deﬁne the variance ratio as
V (t)=
t−1Va r(lne ct − lnc0)
Va r(lne c1 − lnc0)
.
The variance ratio associated to time horizon t equals the variance of the
change in log consumption at horizon t divided by t times the variance of
one year changes in log consumption. V (t) provides a relative measure of the
uncertainty associated to lne ct | c0. In the case of serially independent ∆lnc,
this variance ratio is uniformly equal to unity. V> 1 indicates a positive FSC
correlation in ∆lnc,w h e r e a sV< 1 indicates a negative FSC correlation.
Cochrane (1988) estimated V (t)f o rt =1 ,...,30 by using data on the log
real per capita GNP in the United States, 1869-1986. Figure 1 summarizes















Figure 1: The variance ratio for the log real per capita GNP, 1869-1986.
(Source: Cochrane (1988)).
years is increasing. This comes from the positive serial correlation of growth
at high frequency. On the contrary, V is decreasing in t for time horizons
longer than 3 years. It tends to roughly one-third. Long horizons entail
only one-third per period risk than short horizons, when risk is measured by
the variance of log consumption. This means that shocks to U.S. GNP are
mostly temporary. Thus, in the U.S. context, ∆lnc exhibits negative FSC
correlations for long maturities. According to Proposition 2, this should
generate an upward-sloped unconditional yield curve.
Taking equation (5) as an approximation because e cT | c0 is generally not
lognormal, we can use Cochrane’s V ratio to obtain the following formula for
the yield curve:





Va rlne c1 | c0 is estimated to be 6.1% per year by Cochrane. Let
us ﬁx the expected growth rate of the economy to µ =1 .8% per year, which is
the average growth rate of real per capita consumption in the United States
over the period 1889-1978 (Kocherlakota (1996)). In Figure 2, we draw the
yield curve rt − δ computed from equation (14) for four diﬀerent degrees of
relative risk aversion: γ =1 ,2,4 and 6. The upward-sloping shape of the














Figure 2: The average yield curve using Cochrane’s ratio.
to February 1991, Backus, Foresi and Telmer (1998) estimated the mean 1-
month yield to be 5.314%, going up to 6.693% for the yield corresponding to
a 10-year maturity.
Cogley (1990) showed that the pattern of the variance ratio exhibits much
diﬀerences across countries. In fact, the evidence indicates that the relative
stability of long-term growth is unique to the United States. Using annual
real per capita GDP, 1871-1985, he computed the variance ratio V (20) for
a twenty years horizon. He found 0.77 for Canada, which means that, as
in the U.S. but at a smaller degree, this country should have a mean 20-
year maturity yield that is larger than the short-term yield. He also found
0.97 for Sweden, 1.03 for the United Kingdom, and 1.09 for Denmark. The
yield curve should be almost ﬂat in these countries. But he also obtained
1.4 for Australia, 1.84 for France and 2.02 for Italy. In these countries,
the per-period growth risk is increasing with time horizon. It implies that
the long-term interest rate should be smaller than the short-term one. For
France, using Maddison (1991), we estimated µ =1 .97% and σ =8 .05%. For
γ =2 , it makes a risk-free rate rt equaling δ +2.66% for the short term, and
δ +1 .58% for the long run. For γ =4 , it generates δ +2 .76% and δ −1.54%
respectively for the short term and for the long term.
186 What about far-distant maturities?
As explained in the introduction, our aim is to determine whether the dis-
count rates that we should use for very long maturities (in the hundreds and
thousands years) are smaller than the discount rates used for the more stan-
dard maturities considered in ﬁnance and that can be observed on ﬁnancial
markets. Whereas most of the existing literature provides a positive analysis
of the term structure, our aim in this section is more normative. As ex-
plained earlier in this paper, the evidence that there is some mean-reversion
in consumption growth with a half-life of 2.3 years is important to explain
t h es h a p eo ft h ey i e l dc u r v eo b s e r v e do nﬁnancial markets. It is of course ir-
relevant to determine the rate that we should use to discount the cash-ﬂows
associated with the consequences of, say, global warming or nuclear wastes
in 200 years. In this section, we show how the results presented in sections
3 and 4 are useful to make recommendations for such long time horizons.
We examine two possible dynamic processes governing the long-term
growth of the economy. The ﬁrst one involves Poisson jumps, whereas the
other one exhibits some parameter uncertainty.
6.1 Poisson jumps in the growth of consumption
We reproduced in Table 1 the estimation by DeLong (2004) of the worldwide
GDP per capita over the last 7 millennia. A striking feature of the economic
growth that we observed over this essential period of homo sapiens is the
jump in the average growth rate that has been experienced at the end of the
eighteenth century. The debate on what Society should do for the future is
much inﬂuenced by this fact, and by the idea that in the future, economic
growth could go back to its secular zero level. The arguments for and against
the existence of such risk are based on the way we interpret what happened
at the end of the eighteenth century. Models abound that rely on human
capital, availability of natural resources, specialization of tasks,.... We will
not go into this controversy. As earlier in this paper, the economic growth
process will not be endogenized.
19Year GDP per capita Annualized growth rate
-5000 130
-1000 160 0.005 %
1 135 -0.017 %
1000 165 0.020 %
1500 175 0.012 %
1800 250 0.119 %
1900 850 1.224 %
1950 2030 1.741 %
1975 4640 3.307 %
2000 8175 2.265 %
Table 1: Worldwide GDP per capita (in year-2000 international dollars)
and annualized growth rate (in %). Source: DeLong (2004)
We assume that the economy can be in one of two observable states. In
the low-growth state, the drift of log consumption is µ1 and its volatility is
σ. In the high-growth state, the drift of log consumption is µ2 >µ 1,b u t
the volatility remains the same. The economy switches from one state to
the other each time a Poisson event occurs. In discrete time, the model is
written as
lne ct+1 =l n ct + µt + σe εt




t is µ2 if µt = µ1,o t h e r w i s eµ0
t = µ1. We assume that e εt is standard
normal with no serial dependency. When the drift is µ1 (resp. µ2)i np e r i o d
t, there is a probability π that it will switch to drift µ2 (resp. µ1)i nt h e
next period. We suppose that the probability of switching is very small,
which implies that there is a lot of persistence in shocks. Of course, this
yields FSC correlations in growth rates. There is positive FSC correlations
as soon as π is less than 0.5. Thus, applying Proposition 2 implies that the far-
distant discount rate is smaller than in the equivalent economy with a serially
uncorrelated growth process. In Figure 3, we describe the yield curve in the
following economy: In the high-growth state, the drift of log consumption
is µ2 = 2% per year, whereas it is µ1 = 0% in the low-growth state. The
critical parameter is the switching probability π per year. We assume that
the switching probability π per year is 1%. Relative risk aversion is assumed











Figure 3: The yield curve with a two-state Poisson switch process for the
growth of log consumption, in the high-growth state.
to be constant and equal to γ = 2. We consider a rate δ of pure preference
for the present and a conditional volatility σ of log consumption such that
δ−0.5γ2σ2 =0 .9 We assume that the economy is currently in the high-growth
state. Figure 3 also describes the yield curve in the equivalent economy
with a serially uncorrelated growth process. The details of the computational
method generating these two yield curves are given in the appendix. Whereas
the discount rate is 4% in the ”short” term, it goes down to 1.03% for cash-
ﬂows with a 500-year maturity.
6.2 A model with parameter uncertainty
As invoked in the so-called Peso-problem, the absence of suﬃciently large
data to estimate the long-term growth process of the economy implies that
9As usual, considering other values for δ and σ would just shift the yield curve vertically.
21the parameters controlling the growth process are uncertain and subject to
learning in the future. Weitzman (2004) shows that, under CRRA and ge-
ometric Brownian motion, the uncertainty surrounding the true drift of log
consumption justiﬁes selecting a smaller rate to discount distant cash-ﬂows.
In this section, we explain this phenomenon and we provide a more gen-
eral model than in Weitzman (2004). The intuition for why the uncertainty
surrounding the drift of the growth process justiﬁes selecting a smaller long
discount rate is immediate from Proposition 1. Indeed, the observation of
ah i g hg r o w t hi nt h es h o r tr u ni n d u c e st he representative agent to revise
her expectations about the distribution of growth upwards. Thus, Bayesian
learning generates positive FSC correlation in the perceived growth process.
This magniﬁes the long-term risk, thereby inducing the prudent representa-
tive agent to make more eﬀort for the distant future. As shown by Proposition
1, this result requires no other restriction on preferences than prudence.
We suppose that the growth process is stationary. Let e x(θ)d e n o t et h epe r -
period change in log consumption, conditional to parameter θ. The current
prior beliefs of the representative agent are described by the distribution of
random variable e θ. Under CRRA preferences, the current yield curve takes
the following form:10





where function α is deﬁned as
α(θ)=Ee
−γe x(θ). (16)
Using Jensen’s inequality, we directly get the following result, which is related
to Proposition 2.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the representative agent has CRRA preferences,
and that the process of log consumption is stationary with an unknown pa-
rameter θ. Under such circumstances, the socially eﬃcient discount rate rt
is non-increasing with time horizon t. It tends to the smallest possible rate
minθ [δ − lnα(θ)] when t tends to inﬁnity.


















10In the decorrelated economy, we just have b rt = δ − lnEα(e θ).
22is nonpositive. Thus, rt is non-increasing in t. Moreover, as is well-known,






tends to maxθ α(θ), which implies
that rt tends to δ − lnmaxθ α(θ).¥
Notice that rt is strictly decreasing in t as soon as there exists two values
of the parameter, θ and θ0 such that α(θ) 6= α(θ0). This result and its proof is
reminiscent — but is conceptually diﬀerent — of a recommendation in Weitz-
man (1998) for why ”the far-distant future should be discounted at its lowest
p o s s i b l er a t e ” .N o t i c ea l s ot h a tt h ea b o v er e s u l td o e sn o tr e q u i r ea n yc o n d i -
tion on the distribution of changes in log consumption e x(θ), or on the prior
distribution of parameter e θ. Weitzman (2004) assumes that e x(θ)i sn o r m a l
with a known volatility σ, which implies that α(θ)=e x p ( −γµ(θ)+0.5γ2σ2).
It implies in turn that the discount rate tends to δ− 0.5γ2σ2 + γ minθ µ(θ).
B e c a u s eh ea l s oa s s u m e st h a tµ(e θ) is normally distributed, the discount rate
goes to minus inﬁnity for large maturities under this speciﬁcation!
More realistic speciﬁcations of the per-period growth process and/or of
the prior beliefs are thus welcomed. Equations (15) and (16) provide this
simple and ﬂexible framework. Consider for example the following numerical
illustration. The relative risk aversion of the representative agent equals
γ = 2. The change in log consumption is normal with conditional standard
deviation σ(θ)=6.1%, whereas we assume that δ − 0.5γ2σ2 =0 . The drift µ
is unknown, but it is either 3% or 0%. The prior belief is that there is a 2/3
probability that the true drift is 3%, yielding an expected drift of 2%. If it
would be 3% for sure, the yield curve would be ﬂat at 6%, whereas it would
be equal to 0% in the low-growth scenario. In Figure 4, we draw the yield
curve given the current parameter uncertainty. The learning process induces
Society to use today a 0.22% rate per year to discount cash-ﬂows realized in
500 years, whereas a discount rate of 4.0% per year is used for immediate
beneﬁts and costs.
7C o n c l u s i o n
A correct assessment of how much Society should invest for its own future is
central to economic analysis. Many of us are now cooperating with various
organizations to analyze environmental projects whose costs and beneﬁts are
spread over hundreds of years, in particular those linked to global warming







Figure 4: The yield curve with parameter uncertainty.
and nuclear waste disposals. We know that the most important parameter
when using cost-beneﬁt analysis for such long-lasting projects is by far the
discount rate. We as a profession have not been very good in proposing
an agreed-upon discount rate for the long term. Weitzman (2001) asked to
more than 2000 professional Ph.D.-level economists about their own recom-
mendation for the discount rate to be used for far distant real cash-ﬂows.
He reported a large disagreement on this matter. Moreover, he obtained a
sample mean at around 4% per year, which is quite larger than the secular
post-industrial-revolution real short-term interest rate of 1% (Kocherlakota
(1996)). Economists seem to favor an upward-sloping discount yield curve.
The main message of the paper is that the shape of the term structure
of discount rates depends essentially on our view about how the uncertainty
on future aggregate consumption evolves with the time horizon. If this un-
certainty increases at a rate larger than what would be obtained by a pure
random walk for the per-period growth rate, the notion of prudence justiﬁes
u s i n gad o w n w a r d - s l o p i n gt e r ms t r u c t u re. This is the case when per-period
growth rates exhibit positive ﬁrst-degree stochastic correlations, as is the
case with persistent shocks to growth rates, or when the drift of aggregate
consumption is unknown. Our calibrations induce us to recommend using
24an average yearly discount rate of 4% for short-term cash-ﬂows, and a yearly
discount rate between 1% and 2% for time horizons exceeding 400 years.
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28P r o o fo fL e m m a1
Deﬁne function K as: K(x2 | x1)=F(x2 | x1) − b F(x2), where b F(x2)= R x2 F(y | x1)dG(x1) is the unconditional CDF of e x2.F o rs u ﬃciency, we need
to prove that
X = Eh(e x1,e x2 | e x1) − Eh(e x1,e x2)=
ZZ
h(x1,x 2)dK(x2 | x1)dG(x1)
is positive. For any given x1, integration by parts yields
Z






















K(x2 | e x1)
¸
dx2. (18)
Observe now that for any x2, −∂h/∂x2 is decreasing in x1 because h is
supermodular. Moreover, K is decreasing in x1 for all x2 by deﬁnition of














E [K(x2 | e x1)] = 0.
Since the integrand in (18) is positive for all x2, so is the integral X.T h i s
proves the suﬃciency part of the Proposition. For necessity, suppose by
contradiction that −∂h/∂x2 be increasing in x1 in a neighborhood A of some
(x1,x2). Using a pair of random variables satisfying positive FSC whose
support is in A would generate X ≤ 0, a contradiction. ¥
11Ef(e x)g(e x) ≥ Ef(e x)Eg(e x) for all e x if f0(x)g0(x) is nonnegative for all x.S e ef o r
example Gollier (2001, section 6.4) for a formal proof.
29P r o o fo fL e m m a2
We limit the proof to suﬃciency. Let k(x2 | x1)d e n o t e
R x2 K(y | x1)dy.
Integrating by parts the integral in the right-hand side of equation (17) yields
Z










for all x1. By construction, we have that
k(+∞ | x1)=
Z ³
F(y | x1) − b F(y)
´
dy = E [e x2 | x1] − E [e x2]=0
since the expectation of e x2 is assumed to be independent of x1.T h u sw ec a n
use (19) to write







k(x2 | e x1)
¸
dx2.
Positive SSC means that k is increasing in x1 for all x2. Because ∂2h/∂x2
2 is










E [k(x2 | e x1)]dx2.
Because Ek(x2 | e x1)i sz e r of o ra l lx2 by construction, we obtain that X is
nonpositive.¥
30Computational method used to draw Figure 3
We use the iterative method presented for example by Backus, Foresi and
Telmer (1998) to compute the term structure in the two-state economy with
Poisson switches. Let bt
τ denote the price at date τ of a zero-coupon bond with
maturity t. The CRRA representative agent should be indiﬀerent to increase












Applying this condition for t = 1 and observing that b0
t+1 =1y i e l d s
r1 = −lnb





















t = −t(δ − 0.5γ
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The analysis of the decorrelated economy is organized as follows. Let e yt be
distributed as the change in log consumption in period t conditional to a
high-growth state at date 0. Thus, conditional to µ(t =0 )=µ2, (e y1,e y2,...)
is an independent (decorrelated) process. It happens that e yt is distributed as
(µ2,1−πt;µ1,πt)+σe ε where πt is the probability of a odd number of Poisson
events between 0 and t. The pricing formula in the high-growth state is then
























An equivalent pricing formula is easily obtained for the low-growth state.
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